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REQUESTED, RECOMMENDED AND ALLOWED
RETURNS TO EQUITY: SERENDIPITY OR SUBSTANCE
R. Charles Moyer. Raymond £. Spudeck and David B. Cox

Introduction
In a series of landmark decisions. the United States Supreme Court has
established the judicial standards which guide the determination of the fair rate
of return on common equity capital which is appropriate for a regulated utility
to earn as it discharges its public obligation to serve its customers. Notably. in
the Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Company (320 U.S.
591,603 (1944) ) and the Bluefield Water Wor ks and Improvement Company
v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia (262 U.S. 679. 692-3 (1923) ),
the court defined a fair rate of return in term~ of (I) as~uring confidence in the
financial integrity of the enterprise. so as to maintain its credit, (2) achieving
a level of return comparable to the levels earned by investors in other enterprises
of corresponding risk and uncertainty. and (3) attracting capital on rea~onable
terms.
In reality. the fair rate of return concept has been viewed by many regulatory
bodies as representing a zone of reasonableness - "bounded at one level by investor
interest against confiscation and the need for averting any threat to the security
for the capital embarked upon the enterpri~e. At the other level it is hounded
by consumer interest against excessive and unrea~onable charges for service"
(Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission \". Bell Telephone Company of
Pennsylvania (43 PUR 3d 241. 246 (Pa. 1962) ).
Thus, within this judicial framework of a fair rate of return. we find that
regulators have frequently sought to achieve a balance between the intere~t~ of
the stockholder~ of the utility and the intere~t~ of consumer~ ~erved by that utility.
The objective of this paper is to examine the relative influence of the various
parties represented in a typical rate proceeding (the company. tht: commission
staff, and intcrvenors) in the final determination of an allowed rate of return in
a particular ca~. We intend to provide some in~ight into how this halancc is
achieved.

The Process
In a typical rate proceeding. testimony i~ offered by the company. the regulatory
staff. and one or more intervenors, regarding a fair rate of return on common
equity for the applicant utility. Commonly. the company file, it~ testimony on
rate of return well in advance of the actual hearing (a lag of 6 to 9 months between
the company's filing and the actual hearing is common. both at the ,tate level
and before the FERC). Staff and intervenors normally file their testimony about
~ne month or less prior to the actual hearing. Because of the lag between the
time the firm files its testimony and the time the case is actually heard. one might
expect. a priori , that the company's testimony might have !es~ impact on the
final rate decision than that provided by the other parties in the hearing. The
company ~ometimes updates its initial cost of equity capital testimony just prior
to the hearing of the case, often in the context of rebuttal testimony it prepares.
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With this information at hand, the regulatory commission establishes an allowed
rate of return on common equity which is announced as part of its fi nal order
in the case. The allowed rate of return on common equity together with the
embedded cost of debt and preferred stock, weighted in accordance with the
proportions of each in the firm ·s approved capital structure, forms the overall
rate of return which tbe firm is authorized to earn on its rate base assets.
The focus of this article is on the degree of influence each of the three major
parties to a rate proceeding has in the determination of the fi nal authorized rate
of return on common equity.
The Model

Our model consider5 1he au1horized return on common equity (ROE) 10 be a
function of (I) the utility's requested ROE, (2) the commission staffs recommended ROE. (3) the intervenor's recommended ROE (or the average of
intervenors' recommended ROE'5 in cases where more than one intervenor
supplies ROE testimony), and (4) the perceived "quality' ' of 1he regulatory
environment as reponed by Value Line. The model is written as:
ROE= a+ /31 CO +/32 ST +/33 IN +/34 REG!+ /35 REG2
where
ROE

[I)

= commission·s final

authorized return on common equi1y;
= utilily company's requested return on common equity:
= commission staff', recommended return on common equity:
ST
REGI = a control variable equal to I if the regulatory environment is
considered average. and zero otherwise;
REG2 = a control variable equal to I if the regulatory environment is
considered above-average. and zero otherwise;

co

The excluded set for the regulatory quality variahle is the helow-averagc regulatory
environment.
To estimate equation (I) using ordinary least squares regression techniques.
data on fifty-five electric utility rate proceedings occurring from 1977 through
I983 were collected from Public Utility Reports. All cases with complete
information were included in the sample. The quality of regulation measures were
obtained from Value Line The model v.as then e,umated using ordinary least
squares regression. In addition to the variables shov.n in equation [I]. we also
controlled for nudear risk by including a zero-one "dummy" variable (variable
equals I for nuclear involvement, zero otherwise) in order to account for a firm's
nuclear generation or construction activity. Although 1t did not turn out to be
Matistically significant. the nuclear generation and construction variable is reponed
along with the other results in Table I.
The R2 (coefficient of determination) of the model is .8341. indicating that over
83 percent of the vanauon in the final authorized return on common equity is
explained by the recommended and requested returns which arc filed by the various
parties to a case and by the quality of the regulatory environment.
A doser examination of Table I reveals several interesting insights. First. notice
that the coefficient of th; intervenor's recommended ROE is not statiMically
different from zero, indicati ng that. on average. intervenor's recommendations
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TABLE 1
Regres ion Result,
(Dependent Variable

or Equation I11

= ROE (Return on

Equity Authorized in the

Comnm~ion, · Final Rate Order))
Coefficient

Independent Variable

t-Statistic

Intercept (conMant term}

1.635

1.827*

CO (company ROE reque~tJ

0 342

4071 ..

ST (staff ROE recommendauon)

0428

3.894**

IN (intervenor ROE recommendauonJ

0.082

0.659

REG I (Average Regulator) Environment)

0.090

0.496

REG2 (Above-average Reg Environment)

0 509

I 822*

NUC (Nuclear reliant utility}

0.174

0.957

R~

= 0 8341

F = 46.244
• Coefficient s1gmficant at IO'lc level
**Coefficient significant at I % level
did not carry a ~ignificant weight m the,e rate proceedings. Compare the magnitude
of the ,tatisucally sigmficant coefficient, of the uuht)' company·, and the ,1affs
ROfa. 0 342 and 0.428 respec11vely . The,e coetfic1enb ,uggest that although,
on average. the ,taff, recommended ROE receive, greater weight by the
comm1,,1on m 11s final order. the utilit) s requc\led ROI-' " abo an nnportant
consideration. The greater weight placed on the ,taff', recnmmcndauon ma)
reflect. in part. the fact that the Maff will have filed it, te,umony in clo\Cr proximity
to the actual rate proceed mg. and therefore II ma) more accurate!) reflect capital
market cond11mn, at the lime of the hearing. The model abo ,uggcsts that. on
average. neither the ,taff nor the utility firm·, recommcnJauon, dominate the
dec1smn proce,~
Regarding the quality of regulation, the model indicate, that commissions
considered below average do not ,yMematicall) grant lower ROE, than those
comml\s1ons con\ldered 10 be average (the cocffic1cnt of REG I 1, not ,tausucall)
different from zero). Tho,e commission, considered ahovc average. however.
appear to ~ystemaucally grant higher return~ on equity than tho~c con\ldered belo\l,
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average. The magnitude of the difference is approximately 51 basis points. Finally,
notice that no preferential treatment is given to nuclear-reliant utilities above that
contained in the requested and recommended ROEs presented in the hearing (the
coefficient of the NUC variable is not statistically different from zero).

Forecasting with the Model
In addition to explaining the relative importance of the ROE recommendations
made by the various parties to a rate proceeding, this model also has potential
value as a forecasting tool to predict authorized returns on equity. The ability
to forecast returns on equity prior to a final rate order would be of value to management in its internal budgeting process, and it might also be of value to investors.
A prediction of the final ROE can be found by substituting the known values
into the model as reported in Table I. For example, assume that a utility ha~
filed for rate relief and in the process has asked for a 17 percent return on common equity. The commission staff analysis recommends 15 percent, and an in·
tervenor has suggested 14 percent. The utility has no nuclear facilities. and the
regulatory commission is considered to be of average quality. Using this information and substituting in the estimated model. a prediction of the authorized
return on common equity ROE can be made as follows:
ROE(e~tl= 1.635 + .342(17) + .428(15) + .082(14)
+ .09(1) + .509(0) + .174(0)
15.11%
Note that for prediction purposes. all variables in the model are used , regardless
of whether or not they were statistically significant when the model was estimated.
In general this procedure will result in more accurate forecasts.
Given the same information. the forccasted ROE in the case where a commission
is considered to be of above-average quality is:
ROE(est)= 1.635 + .342(17) +
+ .082(14)
+ .09(0) + .509( I) + . I 74(0)

15.53%

The difference between the two forecasts represents the expected impact of the
change in the regulatory environment from average to above-average .

Conclusions and Limitations
We have examined the determinant~ of the final allowed rate of return on
common equity using a sample of 55 case~ which were decided between 1977
and 1983. In general. we concluded that the commission staff recommendations
carry the greatest weight in the final determination, followed by the company's
recommendations. Thus it appears that commissions do attempt to achieve a
··balance" between the interests of ratepayers and those of stockholders.
Intervenor's recommendations regarding ROE were not statistically significant
in explaining 1he final authorized ROE. Finally. we found that above-average
regulatory commissions authorize returns approximately SI basis points higher
than those authorized by below-average commissions.
31
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Although the model has potential use as a tool to forecast the final authorized
ROE to a utility. it would be desirable to test this forecasting accuracy using an
independent sample of rate cases from a different time period. and to compare
the accuracy of this model to other "naive" forecasting models.
Finally, it is useful to remember that return on common equity is only one
clement in me final rate case decision. Our analysis has been done under the
simplifying assumption !hat there were no systematic offsets to high or low allowed
returns, such as disallowances from rate base, expense disallowances. the use
of hypothetical capital structures, and the like. Each of these factors. and many
more like them. can greatly influence the company's ability to actually earn the
authorized return on common equity.
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